This paper analyzes the effects of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits on unemployment exits and subsequent labor market outcomes. We exploit a piecewise linear relationship between the previous wage and UI benefits in Finland to identify the causal effects of the benefit level by using a regression kink design. According to our findings, higher benefits lengthen nonemployment spells and decrease time spent in part-time unemployment, and thus result in more full-time unemployment. Also the re-employment probability and post-unemployment wage are negatively affected. The results for the duration of the first post-unemployment job are not conclusive, but in total both employment and earnings in the two years following the beginning of the unemployment spell decrease with higher benefits.
Introduction
There is a vast empirical literature showing that more generous unemployment insurance (UI) benets prolong unemployment (see Tatsiramos and van Ours, 2014 , and Schmieder and von Wachter, 2016, for surveys). However, more generous UI benets may also have favorable eects by, for example, improving subsequent job matches. Job seekers with more generous benets can search longer for a job that matches their skills and may, therefore, nd more stable and better paid jobs (Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976, Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999 , and Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000) . On the other hand, if human capital depreciates during unemployment or if employers discriminate against applicants based on their unemployment history, the eect of generous UI benets on match quality can also be negative. Empirical evidence to date is mixed and it is unclear which eect dominates, i.e. do more generous benets improve or impair match quality. This is an important topic because longer unemployment spells caused by higher benets are more (less) acceptable when they lead to better (worse) matches between job seekers and vacant jobs.
In this study, we nd that higher UI benets prolong nonemployment duration and decrease the post-unemployment wage rate. As such, the eect of the benet level on labor market prospects over a longer time period is unambiguously negative. We reach this conclusion using a regression kink design and rich register-based data covering the entire population of unemployed workers in Finland. Our research design exploits the relationship between the previous wage and UI benets. The piecewise linear benet rule allows us to identify the causal eect of the benet level on various outcomes (see Card et al., 2015 , and references therein).
Our ndings indicate that higher UI benets prolong nonemployment duration with an elasticity around 1.5 to 2. We also examine the eect of the UI benet level on the duration of UI benet receipt, but the results are not conclusive. We nd that higher UI benets lead to a decrease in the share of days spent on partial unemployment benets, i.e. in subsidized part-time or temporary jobs. The elasticity of the share of partial unemployment days in the UI spell with respect to the benet level is quite large in absolute value, approximately −5 in most cases, but the average share of partial unemployment days is low to begin with, implying a modest absolute eect. According to our results, the probability that the UI spell ends in employment decreases with a higher benet level, with an elasticity around −0.5. Higher benets also reduce the wage in the rst job after unemployment with an elasticity of around −0.5 to −1. On the other hand, the estimated elasticity of the duration of the next job with respect to the benet level is in general positive, which is somewhat surprising considering our results for the wage rate. The estimates for job duration are, however, very imprecise and hence essentially 2 uninformative.
To assess the overall eect of UI benets we consider cumulative working days and earnings in the two years following the beginning of the unemployment spell. We nd that earnings decrease with higher UI benets with an elasticity of −1 to −2. This earnings eect is inuenced by decreasing working days as we nd that the elasticity of the number of working days in the following two years with respect to the UI benet level is −0.5 to −1. The nding that higher UI benets decrease subsequent working days is obviously at least in part driven by potentially longer nonemployment spells and is consistent with our observation that higher benets lead to less part-time and temporary employment.
All in all, the overall eect of UI benets on labor market outcomes over the period of two years is negative.
As in previous regression kink design studies, our results are quite sensitive to the choices of bandwidth and polynomial order. Since no single optimal procedure to make such choices exists, we report a range of nonparametric estimates based on local linear and quadratic specications using various bandwidth selectors. In addition, we use a more parametric approach with additional covariates and larger samples to increase eciency.
The negative eect of the UI benet level on the share of days spent on partial unemployment benets is robust to changes in the specication and bandwidth, as are the eects on post-unemployment earnings. The results for the other outcomes are more sensitive to changes in the estimation method.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the eects of UI generosity on unemployment and post-unemployment outcomes. Our estimates for the eects of the UI benet level on nonemployment duration are quite imprecise and large compared to the majority of previous elasticity estimates, but are in line with results from Sweden in Carling et al. (2001) . Using Austrian data and a regression kink design similar to ours, Card et al.
(2015) also report elasticities of unemployment duration with respect to the benet level that are higher than those often seen in the literature. Landais (2015) , on the other hand, nds that with US data the elasticity estimates from his regression kink design are lower than in most previous US studies. 1 Previous empirical evidence on the eects of the benet level on subsequent labor market outcomes is scarce and the results are mixed.
2 Addison and Blackburn (2000) 1 Landais notes that this is likely to be due to the endogeneity issues that many previous studies have struggled with. 2 The studies that consider the eects of UI on match quality have mostly analyzed the impacts of potential benet duration. The results of these studies are also mixed, with some studies nding a positive association between benet duration and post-unemployment job quality in terms of either higher wages or job stability (e.g. Tatsiramos nd that higher UI benets have hardly any eect on subsequent wages in the US labor market, but Centeno (2004) shows that higher benets increase the duration of the subsequent employment spell. Ek (2013) nds evidence that higher UI benets decrease annual earnings and monthly wages in Sweden, while the probability of re-employment and employment durations do not appear to be aected. Using Spanish data, Rebollo-Sanz and Rodriguez-Planas (2016) nd no eect on post-unemployment wages and no decrease in other measures of match quality.
Our results are in line with the Swedish evidence on post-unemployment earnings in Ek (2013) and contrary to previous research, indicate that also the re-employment probability and working days in the next two years are aected negatively by a higher UI benet level. Previous studies have not examined the eect of the benet level on time spent in partial unemployment. Our nding that higher UI benets decrease the share of days in subsidized part-time and temporary employment during the UI spell provides new evidence on a potential mechanism through which the generosity of UI benets can aect subsequent labor market outcomes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the Finnish UI system during the period under investigation. This is followed by a section discussing our identication strategy and estimation procedures. Section 4 introduces our data and section 5 contains graphical evidence. Section 6 discusses our estimation results. The nal section concludes.
Institutional framework
In Finland, earnings-related UI benets are paid by unemployment funds, most of which are organized along the industry or occupation lines, and administrated by labor unions.
Membership is voluntary, but as many as 85% of all workers are enrolled in unemployment funds (Uusitalo and Verho, 2010) . A worker who registers as an unemployed job seeker at the public employment agency is entitled to 500 days of UI benets provided that he or she has been a member of an unemployment fund for at least 10 months (membership condition) and has worked for at least 34 weeks during the past 28 months (employment condition). The benets are paid for 5 days a week, so the maximum benet duration is 100 calendar weeks. If the UI recipient leaves unemployment without exhausting his or her benets, and then returns to unemployment before satisfying the employment condition again, he or she will be entitled to unused UI benets from the previous spell (given that he or she did not leave the labor market for a period longer than 6 months without an acceptable reason). Those who exhaust their UI benets can claim a means-tested, atrate labor market subsidy, which is paid by the Social Security Institution for an indenite Daily wage 
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Individuals who participate in labor market training programs receive a labor market training subsidy. Because this subsidy equals the unemployment benet the worker would have otherwise received plus a daily allowance for maintenance and possibly for accommodation, we make no distinction between earnings-related labor market training subsidies and UI benets in our analysis. Furthermore, an unemployed worker who takes up a part-time job (or a very short full-time job) does not necessarily lose his or her benets entirely but may be entitled to a reduced amount of benets. In exchange for these partial benets, the worker is expected to continue his or her search for full-time employment. The entitlement period for a worker on partial UI benets elapses at a reduced rate proportional to the ratio of the partial benet to full-time benet. Due to part-time unemployment and labor market training, UI recipients can collect earnings-related benets longer than 500 days.
The UI benet consists of a basic component equal to the full amount of the labor market subsidy and an earnings-related component. The latter is 45% of the dierence between the previous daily wage (the monthly earnings divided by 21.5) and the basic 3 Those unemployed who do not belong to an unemployment fund but satisfy the employment condition are eligible for a at-rate basic allowance which is the same amount as the labor market subsidy but is not means-tested and is paid for a period of 500 days. In practice, this benet type is of minor importance and their recipients are not covered in our analysis. There are a few exceptions in the benet rules described above. First, workers with at least 20 years of employment history who have been a member of an unemployment fund for at least ve years and who were dismissed without cause can receive a higher benet for up to 185 days. Second, starting in 2005 workers with at least three years of employment history who were dismissed without cause or who worked for the same employer under xed-term contracts for at least 36 months within the past 42 months have had an option to enroll in an employment program. Participants of this program are entitled to higher UI benets for 20 days and a higher labor market training subsidy for the duration of training programs that are specied in an individual-specic action plan.
Finally, workers aged 59 or more (57 or more for those born before 1950) on the day when regular UI benets expire are entitled to extended UI benets until retirement. We do not consider these groups of workers with diering benet schedules in our analysis.
3 Statistical methods
Identication
To identify the eect of UI benets we take advantage of the kink in the benet rule that determines the benet level as a function of past daily wage (i.e the change in the slope at 107 EUR in gure 1). The basic idea is that a kink in the relationship between the outcome variable (e.g. unemployment duration) and the past wage at the kink point of the benet rule is indicative of the causal eect of benets under the identifying assumption that the direct eect of past wage on the outcome is smooth at that point. This approach is known as regression kink design (RKD) due to Nielsen et. al (2010) , and it is a close cousin of the regression discontinuity design. While the regression discontinuity design identies the causal eect from a jump in the average outcome associated with a jump in 4 There is a xed supplement to the daily benet corresponding to the number of dependent children. The benet increases stepwise for one, two and three or more children, without aecting the size of the kink at 107 EUR. 6 the policy variable, the regression kink design identies the causal eect from a kink in the average outcome associated with a kink in the policy variable.
To x ideas, consider the following stylized model
where Y is an outcome (e.g. unemployment duration or post-unemployment earnings), B = b(W ) is the daily UI benet, which is a deterministic function of the previous daily wage W with a kink at W = w * , and ε is an error term. 
where B and W are mean-independent of the new error term υ by construction. However, the eect of B cannot be distinguished from the direct eect of W without further assumptions. Nielsen et al. (2010) show that if g (·) is continuously dierentiable without having a kink at W = w * , then
The RKD estimand, the right-hand side of (3), equals the ratio of the change in the slope of the conditional expectation of the outcome variable to the change in the slope of the deterministic benet rule at the cuto w * . Thus, despite the endogeneity of the UI benet, its causal eect is identied without any assumptions about g (·) except the smoothness.
Given the result in (3) we could estimate τ by regressing Y on B while controlling for the direct eect of W using some exible but smooth function. Alternatively, we can invoke the relationship in (3) directly. This latter approach is more general as it does not hinge on the assumption that the regression function is additively separable. Namely, Card et al. (2015) show that the RKD estimand can be interpreted as the average treatment 7 eect in a more general, nonseparable model of the form Y = y(B, W, ε), (4) which allows for unrestricted heterogeneity in the eect of B. They show that for this model the RKD estimand identies 
where P is the order of the polynomial function, K (·) is a kernel function, h is a bandwidth, Ω − and Ω + are the set of observations below and above the wage cuto w * re-
spectively. An estimate for the average local treatment eect is obtained by dividing the estimate of β If the uniform kernel is used, which is the leading choice in the applied work, the estimation problem reduces to OLS estimation of the model
where D = 1 {w > w * } is an indicator for observations with the previous wage above the cuto, using a subsample of observations in a neighborhood of the cuto that satisfy the condition |w − w * | ≤ h. Because δ 1 is the change in the slope of the conditional expectation of Y at w * , we can obtain an estimate of τ by dividing the OLS estimate of δ 1 with the change in the slope of the benet rule at w * .
In addition to the kernel function, we also need to choose the bandwidth h and the polynomial order P . The bandwidth is a trade-o between the precision of the estimates and accuracy of the polynomial approximation to the unknown underlying expectation function. Several competing bandwidth selector methods have been proposed. Calonico et al. (2014) argue that the commonly used bandwidth selectors tend to yield bandwidths that are too large to ensure the validity of the underlying distributional approximations.
As a result, the RKD estimates may be subject to a non-negligible bias and the resulting condence intervals can be severely biased. They propose an alternative method where the RKD point estimate is corrected by an estimated bias term, and the standard error estimates are adjusted for additional variability that results from the estimation of the bias correction term. This procedure yields bias-corrected point estimates and condence intervals that are more robust to the bandwidth choice than the conventional methods. When it comes to the choice of the polynomial order, linear (P = 1) and quadratic (P = 2) models have been typically used in nonparametric analysis. Calonico et al.
(2014) state that the local quadratic estimator is preferable to the local linear estimator in the RKD setting due to boundary bias considerations, whereas Card et al. (2014 Card et al. ( , 2016 argue that the best choice of polynomial order in MSE sense depends on the sample size and the (unknown) derivative of the conditional expectation function E (Y | W = w) (and E (B| W = w) in the fuzzy RKD settings) in the particular data set. In empirical applications, the polynomial models have often been compared using some information criteria.
In general, RKD estimates have been found to be rather sensitive with respect to polynomial order and bandwidth choices (but not to the choice of the kernel function). This is unfortunate as there is no consensus on how these choices should be made. In our analysis, we present a range of conventional and bias-corrected nonparametric local linear and quadratic estimates using alternative bandwidth selectors to provide a clear picture of the sensitivity of our estimates to these choices. We also conduct more parametric analysis by estimating models from larger subsets of data (i.e. including also observations far away from the wage cuto ) while controlling for observed individual characteristics and choosing the polynomial order on the basis of the Akaike information criteria.
Data and descriptive statistics
Our data are drawn from various administrative registers. The primary data source is the register on job seekers, maintained by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy.
The register covers all registered applicants at the public employment agency. Without registration as an unemployed job seeker one cannot qualify for unemployment benets, so all UI recipients and many unemployed non-recipients and employed job seekers should be included. The register contains information on unemployment spells, labor market training courses and job placement programs, as well as demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, education, occupation and living region. However, there is no information on receipt of unemployment benets, nor on job spells or earnings.
While UI benets are paid by individual unemployment funds, each fund must report the benets it paid out to the the Insurance Supervisory Authority. From its registers we obtain information on received UI benets and earnings-related labor market training subsidies. In addition, we merge employment and earnings records from the registers of the Finnish Centre for Pensions, which is a statutory co-operation body of all providers of earnings-related pensions in Finland. It keeps comprehensive records on job spells and earnings for the entire Finnish population, which will be used to determine pension benets.
We focus on workers who became unemployed between 2003 and 2007 and who qualied for 500 days of UI benets. The beginning of the period is restricted by the fact that there were changes in the benet schedule before this. We do not consider unemployment spells that began after 2007 in order to have a long enough follow-up period for postunemployment outcomes. Our current data ends in December 2009. We exclude workers older than 54 (to drop those eligible for extended UI benets after regular UI benets) and those who were eligible for the higher benet based on long employment history or due to participating in labor market training based on the action plans. We also exclude individuals whose UI benets have been reduced due to other benets, 5 those who began to collect UI benets more than 80 days after the date of job separation, 6 and those who have been laid o temporarily (the temporary layo status is directly observed in the UI records). We express daily wages in 2009 EUR using the deator applied to the unemployment benets, and pool the observations from dierent years by centering around the wage cuto. The daily wage is determined during the employment condition weeks and is the actual wage used as the basis of the benet payments. In order to eliminate the kinks at the lower end of the wage distribution, we drop individuals whose daily wage deviates from the wage cuto by more than 55 EUR. Finally, we drop 286 observations that are outside the true benet schedule. These constitute only 0.14% of our estimation sample and dropping them enables us to use a sharp regression kink design. After these restrictions, our estimation sample consists of almost 200,000 unemployment spells.
We consider several unemployment outcomes. One measure is the time to the next job (or nonemployment duration), which is dened as the number of days between two consecutive job spells. We dene UI duration as the sum of days on UI benets and earnings-related labor market subsidies. We consider a spell as ending in employment if the person becomes employed for a period of at least four weeks. Shorter breaks are considered part of the same nonemployment spell and ignored in the measure of unemployment duration. Our results are robust to variations in this condition. All job placement 5 Benets such as home care allowance when taking care of children as well as partial disability pension can lower the UI benet an unemployed worker is entitled to. We exclude 2,539 individuals due to such reductions. 6 Our results are robust to varying this restriction between 30 and 90 days.
11 programs are observed in the data and transitions into these programs are not regarded as transitions into employment when calculating the time to the next job or dening the re-employment status. Periods on partial UI benets and labor market training are included in the unemployment spells and we examine how the benet level aects the fraction of days on partial benets during the compensated spell of unemployment. The nonemployment spells as well as the UI benet spells are censored at two years.
In table 1 we report descriptive statistics for the whole estimation sample described above as well as the sample around the kink point. Panel A describes our outcome variables and panel B shows descriptive statistics for individual characteristics. As discussed above we consider unemployment outcomes including the UI duration, total nonemployment duration and the share of UI benet days that is spent on partial benets, i.e. in subsidized part-time or temporary employment. We also examine the share of UI benet spells ending in employment and in order to analyze the quality of the post-unemployment jobs we consider the wage and duration of the next job.
7 To get a more comprehensive picture of post-unemployment outcomes, we also consider working days and earnings within the rst two years following the beginning of the unemployment spell.
In all our outcome measures, the dierences between the full sample and the sample around the kink point are in line with the fact that the kink point is situated in the upper part of the wage distribution. The average previous daily wage in the full sample is 87 EUR which is 19 percent lower than the kink point of 107 EUR. Workers around the kink point nd a new job somewhat faster than an average UI recipient (218 versus 231 days), and their new jobs are higher paid and last longer on average. The main dierences in individual characteristics between the full sample and the sample around the kink point also stem from the location of the kink point slightly higher than the mean in the wage distribution. The sample around the kink point has a slightly lower share of women and is somewhat higher educated. Our sample does not include workers who have voluntarily quit their jobs and who are therefore subject to a 90-day waiting period, and therefore the rather low share of dismissed workers reects the large share of workers who have been employed with xed-term contracts prior to unemployment.
Graphical evidence
The key identifying assumption in our RKD analysis is that conditional on ε, the density of the past wage is smooth at the wage cuto w * . This smooth density condition rules out Notes: The around-the-kink sample includes those unemployed whose previous daily wage deviates from the cuto value by 10 EUR or less. The group Manufacturing I includes painters, textile, metal, machinery, electrical and wood workers and the group Manufacturing II includes handicraft, printing, food processing, chemical processing, paper production and machine operators in energy production and water supply and treatment. The number of observations in each bin is regressed on polynomials of previous earnings (centered at the cuto ) and the interaction term. When we do a similar exercise, the coecient of the interaction term for the rst order polynomial is insignicant, indicating that the smoothness assumption is not violated.
The regression kink design also requires that the relationship between the covariates and the outcome variable is smooth around the cuto point. In order to examine whether this holds in our set up, we plot mean values of selected covariates in each bin of the assignment variable. As seen in gure 3, there are nonlinearities in the relationship between some covariates and daily wage. We also observe clear kinks, for example, around −30 EUR in the share of health care and social work employees, and around −10 EUR in the share of spells beginning in June or July. Nonetheless, the covariates evolve rather smoothly around the cuto point and bias-corrected estimates using MSE-optimal band-8 Point estimate of log dierence in height is 0.0069 with standard error 0.021.
14 widths for each covariate indicate no signicant kinks in the covariates. Figure 4 displays the relationship between previous wage and various outcomes. We observe some nonlinearities in the relationship between previous wage and the outcomes, which are likely to be associated with compositional changes in the underlying population as we also see nonlinearities in the covariates. Due to these nonlinearities, the local linear model can t the data well only for relatively short bandwidths, i.e. bandwiths of 30
EUR at a maximum. Wider bandwiths call for higher order polynomials and/or controls for observed characteristics. Focusing on the cuto, there appears to be some evidence of kinks at the wage cuto, most notably for the fraction of partial unemployment.
6 Regression kink estimates
Conventional local linear models
The graphical evidence in gure 4 suggests that the local linear model could t the data well near the wage cuto but is likely to be too restrictive for wider bandwidths. As such we restrict our local linear regression analysis to bandwidths between 10 and 30 EUR.
We do not report results for smaller bandwidths which are very noisy and essentially uninformative. We also estimated kinks for the covariates using the MSE-optimal bandwidth for our UI duration outcome and none of the estimates were signicant. Looking next at the eect of the UI benet level on the re-employment probability, the elasticity estimates in gure 5 are negative, but only barely signicant at a few bandwidths. A negative estimate would imply that higher benets lower the re-employment probability, but even though the eect is more precisely estimated at wider bandwidths, we lack statistical power to be able to say anything conclusive. The estimated elasticity of the duration of the rst job after re-employment is positive and around 1, but again statis- To sum up, the elasticity estimates in gure 5 are relatively insensitive with respect to the bandwidth choice but rather imprecise. We nd statistically signicant negative eects on the fraction of part-time unemployment and earnings within the next two years.
The eects on the duration and wage of the next job are only marginally signicant. Other eects have expected sign but are too imprecisely estimated for any conclusions. 
Bias-corrected estimates
To study the robustness of the results depicted in the gures above, we next present both conventional and bias-corrected estimates from linear and quadratic specications using dierent bandwidth selection methods.
10 Tables 2 and 3 Looking rst at the UI duration, the elasticity estimates vary somewhat depending on the estimation method used, with the bias-corrected estimates slightly higher in general.
The bias-corrected estimates range from 0.9 to 3.8 and are quite noisy, with especially the narrow CER-optimal bandwidths leading to very large standard errors. Using the MSEoptimal bandwidth for the linear specication, the elasticity estimates of 3.0 and 3.8 are statistically signicant, albeit quite high compared to the other point estimates from linear models at wider bandwidths. They are more in line with the elasticity estimates from quadratic specications, which also are rather large but mainly statistically insignicant.
Turning to the elasticity estimates for the time to the next job, i.e. nonemployment duration, the bias-corrected estimates are again larger than the conventional estimates. Using the narrow CER-optimal bandwidth the estimates are higher than at the MSE-optimal bandwidths, but the standard errors are also large leading to essentially uninformative results. The wider MSE-optimal bandwidths without regularization yield bias-corrected elasticities of 1.5 and 1.6 for the linear and quadratic specications respectively, with the quadratic estimate statistically signicant. The elasticity of 1.6 would imply a 3. which is in line with our bias-corrected estimates at the MSE-optimal bandwidths without regularization.
The elasticity estimates in gure 5 implied that the fraction of time spent on partial 10 We use the rdrobust package (Calonico et al. 2016b ) for these estimations 20 unemployment benets would increase if the UI benet level decreased. This also shows up in the bias-corrected estimates in table 2, where the elasticity of partial unemployment w.r.t. the UI benet level is negative except at the very narrow CER-optimal bandwidths.
The standard errors for the bias-corrected estimates using the CER-optimal bandwidths are again very large leading to uninformative point estimates. The bias-corrected estimates from the linear specication at the MSE-optimal bandwidth with and without the regularization term indicate elasticities of −9 and −7.5 respectively. As discussed above related to gure 5, the average share of partial unemployment days in an UI spell is quite low and conceals a high share of partial unemployment conditional on taking up any partial unemployment benets. The elasticity of −9 implies that a 1% decrease in the UI benet level would lead to a 0.4 percentage point increase in the fraction of time spent on partial unemployment benets. Although this is a small increase, it does indicate that lower benets induce the unemployed to take up part-time or temporary jobs. The biascorrected estimates for elasticity of the re-employment probability w.r.t the UI benet 21 level in table 2 are also negative except for the narrow CER-optimal bandwidths, but all the estimates are statistically insignicant. Considering the noisy conventional elasticity estimates in gure 5, this is not surprising. Table 3 shows the elasticity estimates for post-unemployment outcomes. As with the unemployment outcomes, estimates from both linear and quadratic specications for various optimal bandwidth selection methods are shown. The bias-corrected elasticity estimate of the duration of the next job w.r.t the UI benet level is not robust to dierent polynomial orders and bandwidths. The point estimates are mostly positive, but very imprecise. For the rst post-unemployment wage the bias-corrected elasticity estimates are negative except when using the narrow CER-optimal bandwidth in the quadratic specication. The narrow bandwidths lead, once again, to very large standard errors. The bias-corrected estimates using the MSE-optimal bandwidths with and without regularization range from −0.25 to −1.4 but are not statistically signicant. In line with gure 5, the conventional elasticity estimate at the MSE-optimal bandwidth without regularization is −0.79 and statistically signicant.
Working days within the two years following the beginning of the unemployment spell appear to be slightly negatively aected by a higher level of UI benets. The biascorrected elasticity estimates are negative across the board, but again the narrow CERoptimal bandwidths are associated with very large standard errors. The point estimates with larger absolute values (−2.2 and −2.6 in linear and quadratic models) are marginally signicant implying that a 1% increase in the UI benet level would lead to a 7 to 8 day decrease in the number of working days in the following two years. As discussed above, such an eect is consistent with a longer initial unemployment duration and less time spent in part-time and temporary employment. Bias-corrected elasticity estimates for earnings in the two years after the beginning of the unemployment spell are also negative except at the narrow CER-optimal bandwidths. The linear specication with the wider MSE-optimal bandwidth without the regularization term yields a statistically signicant elasticity estimate of −1. Such a decrease in earnings due to higher UI benets is in line with our ndings of lower post-unemployment wages and less working days in subsequent years.
Higher order polynomials and larger bandwidths
Most of the nonparametric estimates above are quite noisy. To increase statistical power of the analysis we also conduct a more parametric analysis using larger subsets of the data.
Because the relationships between the outcome variables and daily wage become clearly nonlinear when we move away from the wage cuto (see gure 4), it is quite obvious that the linear model does not t to the data well when large bandwidths are used and hence 22 higher order polynomial models are called for. We consider polynomial models of orders 1 to 3, with and without control variables. In tables 4 and 5 we report elasticity estimates for bandwidths ranging from 10 to 55 EUR from the specication with the lowest value of the Akaike information criterion.
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The estimates in panel A are from the specication outlined in (6) , whereas the estimates in panel B are from an augmented specication that include controls for the year and month of unemployment entry, gender, the number of children, interactions between the number of children and gender, education, occupation, age, capital region and a dummy for dismissed workers.
In the local analysis, the control variables do not contribute to identication but their inclusion may reduce sample noise and hence lead to more precise elasticity estimates.
Their inclusion also provides a useful robustness check, as the point estimates should not 11 For most outcomes the estimates from the linear models are sensitive with respect to the bandwidth, whereas the estimates from quadratic and cubic models remain quite stable after a certain value of the bandwidth (typically around 30 EUR). Notes: BW = bandwidth. N = Number of observations. Pol. = Order of the polynomial function chosen on the basis of the Akaike information criterion. Elasticities in panel B are from models that include controls for the year and month of unemployment entry, gender, the number of children, interactions between the number of children and gender, education, occupation, age, capital region and a dummy for dismissed workers. The standard errors in parenthesis. Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
change notably. A comparison of the models for larger bandwidths is less straightforward.
The kinks in the relationships between the background characteristics and daily wage in gure 3 raise some doubts about the smoothness assumption of the wage eect in the unconditional models when large bandwidths are used. The inclusion of control variables can mitigate confounding nonlinearities due to nonsmooth changes in the (observed) composition of the workers across the wage distribution (Aldo, 2016) . In the case of large bandwidths the smoothness assumption may therefore be more likely to be valid and the RKD estimates more reliable when we condition on the covariates. A counter argument is that the kinks in the distributions of observed characteristics make also kinks in the distribution of unobserved characteristics more likely, and thereby the RKD estimates should be treated with caution.
The results in tables 4 and 5 show that the point estimates from our parametric analysis are in general relatively stable across the range of bandwidths and, given the same polynomial degree, the estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of control variables.
Somewhat larger dierences emerge for wider bandwiths but this is to be expected. The elasticity of the UI duration w.r.t the UI benet level is around 1 but the estimates are rather imprecise and not robust to the inclusion of control variables. The elasticity of the time to next job is slightly higher at just below 2. This estimate is robust to the inclusion of covariates when the bandwidth is at least 35 EUR. For bandwidths between 15 to 30 EUR the elasticity from the quadratic model is also around 2, with an AIC only marginally higher than for the linear model reported in the table. These elasticity estimates are around the same magnitude as our bias-corrected nonparametric estimates for nonemployment duration and since they increase in precision with the increase in bandwidth and addition of covariates, this robustness check is reassuring in terms of tackling the lack of sucient data in the vicinity of the cuto for this outcome.
As in our previous results, the elasticity of partial unemployment is large in absolute value. The estimate appears sensitive to the inclusion of covariates and bandwidth, but is consistently negative across the range of bandwidths. The elasticity of the re-employment probability is robust around −0. Notes: BW = bandwidth. N = Number of observations. Pol. = Order of the polynomial function chosen on the basis of the Akaike information criterion. Elasticities in panel B are from models that include controls for the year and month of unemployment entry, gender, the number of children, interactions between the number of children and gender, education, occupation, age, capital region and a dummy for dismissed workers. The standard errors in parenthesis. Signicance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
Robustness checks
As a comparison, we also estimate bias-corrected nonparametric elasticities of our various outcomes using linear and quadratic specications for a range of bandwidths. 13 12 Results not shown, available on request. The pilot bandwidth used for estimating the bias was set to be equal to the main bandwidth. See Calonico et al. (2016a) for discussion. 13 Results not shown, available on request. In addition to varying bandwidths and alternative estimation methods we also consider the robustness of our results by examining the eect of the UI benet level on outcomes at dierent cuto points. In gure 6 we provide elasticity estimates from local linear regressions similar to those in gure 5 but for placebo cuto points. The true value of the cuto is at 0 in each gure and the p-value indicates the fraction of estimates that are larger in absolute value than the estimate at the true cuto. The outcomes for which the results have been consistent in our other robustness checks are also clearest here, i.e.
the share of partial unemployment in the UI spell and earnings within two years of the beginning of the unemployment spell. For the other outcomes it is harder to distinguish the estimates at the true cuto from the placebo estimates. Given that the elasticity estimates for e.g. unemployment duration were small and imprecise, it is unsurprising that a large fraction of the placebo estimates are larger than the actual estimates. Moreover, for several outcomes there are clearly distinguishable signicant placebo estimates that coincide with the kinks in the share of health care and social workers and the month of unemployment entry, that is, when the placebo cuto is smaller than the true one (see gure 3). Therefore, it appears that the changes in workforce composition across the wage distribution are inuencing these estimates. As discussed in the previous section, this should be taken into account when using observations further away from the cuto by applying quadratic or even higher order polynomial models and/or by including control variables in the analysis.
Conclusions
Research on the eects of the UI benet level on labor market outcomes other than unemployment duration is scarce and the results are mixed. In this study we have provided further evidence on the eects of the UI benet level on unemployment and subsequent labor market outcomes. To identify the causal eect of the UI benet level, we exploited a kink in the relationship between the previous wage and UI benets in Finland. We used a large register based data set with accurate information on the UI benet level and previous wage which allowed us to apply a sharp regression kink design. We compared dierent nonparametric estimation methods proposed in the literature on regression kink design and similar to previous studies our results were quite sensitive to choices regarding polynomial order and bandwidth. Despite the large data and accurate benet and wage information, our nonparametric estimates were rather imprecise regardless of the polynomial order and bandwidth selection method. Results from specications with added covariates estimated using larger samples were more precise and generally of the same magnitude as nonparametric estimates from our other specications.
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We found robust evidence that the UI benet level has a large negative eect on the share of days spent on partial unemployment benets during the UI spell, i.e. the time spent in subsidized part-time or temporary employment. Also the ndings for postunemployment earnings were robust to varying estimation methods: Our results showed that the wage in the rst job after unemployment and also subsequent earnings in the two years after the beginning of the unemployment spell decrease with an increase in the UI benet level. Results for other outcomes were more sensitive to the choice of specication, but our ndings indicate that higher UI benets also increase the nonemployment duration and decrease the re-employment probability and number of working days in the next two years. We also examined the duration of UI benet receipt and the duration of the rst post-unemployment job, but the results for these outcomes were inconclusive.
In summary, we found no evidence of positive eects on match quality for the UI benets, and thereby the overall eect of higher UI benets on labor market outcomes over the two-year period is unambiguously negative.
